“Anti-Europe”: How European Thought Invented Its Confucian Other

On my book “Anti-Europa” – Die Geschichte der Rezeption des Konfuzianismus und der konfuzianischen Gesellschaft seit der frühen Aufklärung (Münster: Lit-Verlag, 2003, 699 pp.)

Here is a puzzle that has occupied me for much of my scholarly life. For more than three hundred years, European thinkers have described Confucian society using essentially the same vocabulary: familism, dependency, particularism, authoritarian behaviour. The descriptions barely changed. What changed — dramatically, repeatedly — was their valuation. The very same traits that made China a model civilization for Leibniz became proof of despotism for Kant’s generation, evidence of stagnation for Marx and Weber, and then, in the late twentieth century, the secret engine of the East Asian economic miracle.

How can identical characteristics be read as the realization of Plato’s ideal state in one century and as the epitome of backwardness in the next? My book “Anti-Europa”, published in German in 2003, is an attempt to answer this question. The title comes from Leibniz, who called China “Anti-Europe” — not in the sense of an enemy, but of the other Europe at the far end of the Eurasian continent: a mirror civilization, equal in achievement and worthy of study.

The argument

The book traces the European — and especially the German — reception of Confucianism and Confucian society from the early Enlightenment to the end of the twentieth century. Its central claim is that this history tells us far more about Europe than about East Asia. European thinkers did not, on the whole, study Confucian societies in order to understand them. They projected onto the Confucian “Other” whatever their own political struggles required — a model to emulate, a despotism to reject, a stagnation to overcome, a work ethic to envy. As Edward Said observed of the Western image of the Orient, these images explain more about the intellectual condition of Europe than about the societies they claimed to describe.

Methodologically, the book proposes that “the foreign” and “the Other” be taken seriously as an independent analytical category in the history of political ideas. Once we do this, something uncomfortable comes into view: the supposedly universal claims of Western Enlightenment political thought were constructed, in part, through these instrumentalized images of the non-European world — and their universality reaches its limits precisely there.

Four paradigms in three hundred years

The history unfolds in four periods.

1670–1760: The Confucian ideal state. Early Enlightenment thinkers, searching for a moral philosophy grounded in human nature rather than divine commandment, found in the Jesuit reports from China something extraordinary: a vast, ancient, prosperous civilization whose ethics apparently owed nothing to revelation. For Leibniz, China was living proof of natural reason. Christian Wolff’s famous 1721 Halle lecture on Chinese practical philosophy — which cost him his professorship and nearly his life — celebrated a state in which office was earned by examination rather than birth: Plato’s philosopher-cabinet made real. Confucius stood beside Socrates. China was a model for political reform in Europe.

1760–1840: Oriental despotism. Within a generation, the picture inverted. For thinkers no longer under Wolff’s sway, a well-meaning paternal ruler was not enough; the new demand was freedom, and China became the symbol of a stage Europe had already overcome. Kant’s severing of nature and reason provided the theoretical instrument: if reason must be acquired rather than possessed by nature, the Chinese could be relegated to humanity’s “childhood.” Herder’s metaphors — the “embalmed mummy,” the “sleeping winter animal” — did lasting damage. The Göttingen universal historians classified all of East Asian history, including its present, as ancient history. Hegel completed the demotion: China as the first, frozen stage of world history, the embodiment of unfreedom, held up as a mirror to Europe’s enemies of progress.

1840–1970: Stagnation explained. After the Opium War, China’s military defeat was read as proof of civilizational failure, and the question shifted to economics: why did capitalism not develop there? Marx’s “Asiatic mode of production” and, above all, Max Weber’s study of Confucianism supplied the enduring answer — Confucian culture itself was the obstacle. Weber argued with historical facts, yet his analysis projected categories developed for Mediterranean antiquity onto China, producing what I describe as a peculiar amalgam of facts, false assumptions, and incorrect interpretations. His premise — that cultural value systems decisively determine economic systems — became the starting point of East Asian studies for a century, in East Asia no less than in the West.

1970–2000: Confucian capitalism. Then Japan and the “four tigers” rose, and the same cultural traits that had explained stagnation were rediscovered as the engine of hypergrowth. “Confucian capitalism” and the “Asian values” discourse turned Weber on his head while keeping his premise intact — and served, along the way, as a political instrument both for neo-conservatives in the West and for authoritarian rulers like Lee Kuan Yew. When the Asian financial crisis struck in 1997/98, the pendulum swung once more: now “crony capitalism,” rooted in Confucian culture, explained the collapse.

Four paradigms, one constant: at no point was the object of all this theorizing studied for its own sake.

Why this history matters now

I finished this book two decades ago, but its subject has refused to retire. Since the 2000s, the “Renaissance of Confucianism” in China has re-entered Western debate, and prominent voices now argue that Chinese-style political meritocracy remedies the flaws of electoral democracy — offering more stability, sustainability, even moral desirability than Western liberalism. Readers of this blog will recognize the pattern immediately: it is Wolff’s philosopher-cabinet again, revalued for a new geopolitical moment, and no closer than before to an analysis of how East Asian societies actually work. The history of projection continues in real time. Understanding its mechanics — who produced these images, from which sources, for which domestic purposes — seems to me a precondition for thinking clearly about Europe–Asia relations today.

About the book, and a note on access

“Anti-Europa” began as my Habilitation and appeared with Lit-Verlag in 2003. At 699 pages, it works through the sources thinker by thinker — Leibniz, Wolff, Justi, Kant, Herder, the Göttingen historians, Hegel, Marx, Weber, and the Confucian-capitalism literature — always asking the same questions: What information about Confucianism was actually available? Which sources were used, and why? What political meaning was attached to the resulting image?

The book has so far existed only in German. A thoroughly revised and updated English edition is currently in preparation; I will report on its progress here. In the meantime, several of my English- and German-language articles develop individual strands of the argument, among them “Christian Wolff, China and Confucius” (Discourse 201, 2008), “Kant on East Asia” (Discourse 201, 2007), and “Eine Wiedergeburt von Konfuzius? Die ‘Renaissance des Konfuzianismus’ in Ostasien” (Leviathan, 2018). Details are on my publications page.

Bibliographic reference: Eun-Jeung Lee, “Anti-Europa” – Die Geschichte der Rezeption des Konfuzianismus und der konfuzianischen Gesellschaft seit der frühen Aufklärung. Eine ideengeschichtliche Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung. Münster–Hamburg–London: Lit-Verlag, 2003.

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